JOHNSON vs. STEAR.

dence in the cause, they have not satisfactorily, explained their
connection therewith. It was for them, by clear and explicit
proofs, to establish their case. They have not done so. Their
goods stand affected by the fraud, and must share the fate of the
contraband articles.
If Harman was not their agent in this transaction, then they
shipped the goods in dispute without any permit whatever, and
the same legal consequence follows.
Independent of the apparent fraud, the permit covered none
of Harman & Daily's goods, and could not be lawfully used for
such a purpose. They were not named in the permit as applicants
or consignees. The license was personal to Hicks & Cocke; it
covered only their shipments; it was not negotiable or transferrable ; it could not be -made to include anything not specified in
it. The attempt to use it otherwise, worked a forfeiture of the
whole shipment.
The claim is dismissed, with costs, and the property
declared forfeited.
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Court of Common Pleas.
JOHNSON, ASSIGNEE OF CUMING, VS. STEAR.
Mi trover by the assignees of a bankrupt, the facts were, that the bankrupt
had deposited certain dock warrants for brandy in dock as security for a loan;
and it was agreed that the pledgee might sell the brandy if the loan was not
repaid on the 29th January. The pledgee sold the brandy on the 28th of Janu-.
ary, and delivered the dock warrants to the purchaser on the 29th, and the purchaser took possession on the 30th. The bankrupt would not have redeemed
the dock warrants :-Hdd, that the sale and delivery of the dock warrants was
a conversion by the pledgee.
Per EnLiE, C. J., BYLEs and KEATIxO, JJ.-That the damage recoverable for the
conversion was to be measured by the loss actually sustained by the pledger,
and that, in measuring the damage, the interest of the pledgee in the pledge at
the time of conversion is to be taken into account.
VoL. XII.-48
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J.-That the sale of the brandy by the pledgee before the time agreed.
terminated the bailment, and thereupon the property reverted absolutely to the
pledger, and, therefore, that the measure of damage is the value of the gobds
at the time of conversion.

WILLIAMs,

Trover by the assignlees of one Cuming, a. bankrupt, for certain
cases of brandy. Pldas.-Not guilty, and not possessed.
At the trial, before Erle, C. J., at the Sittings in London after
Easter Term, it appeared that the plaintiff was the assignee of
John Cuming, a commission agent; and in the year 1862, John
Cuming borrowed- of the defendant the sum of 621. 10s., and gave
him a bill of exchange, payable on the 29th January, 1863, and also
deposited with him, by way of security, dock warrants of 243 cases
of brandy, and wrote to him the following letter.:,,Sir,-I have this deposited with you the undermentioned 243
cases of brandy, to be held by you as a security for the payment
.of my acceptance for 621. 10g., discounted by you, -which will become due on the 29th January, 1863 ; and in case the same be not
paid at maturity, I authorize you at any time, and without further
consent by, or notice to, me, to sell the goods above mentioned,
either by public or private sale, at such price as you think fit, and
to apply the proceeds, after all charges, to the payment of the bill;
and, if there should be any deficiency, I engage to pay it.
-I am, yours, truly,
46"MOORE, CUMING & Co."
On the 16th January, 1863, the saict John Cuming was adjudicated a bankrupt; and on the 28th January 'the defendant sold
the brandy, and the ordinary bought and sold notes were exchanged
between the defendant and the purchaser. On the 29th January
the defendant delivered to the purchaser the dock warrants for the
brandy, who, on the 30th, obtained possession. The jury found a
verdict for the plaintiff for the value of the brandy. The learned
judge gave the defendant leave to move to enter the verdict for him,
or to reduce.thd damages to 40s.
Powell, Q. C., obtained a rule accordingly.
Denman, Q. C., and Howard showed cause.-The delivery of

JOHNSON vs. STEAR.

755

she dock warrants to the purchaser on the 29th, pursuant to the
agreement on the 28th, was a wrongful conversion by the defendant on the 28th. The property in the brandy passed to the purchaser on the 28th, for the delivery of the dock warrants on the
29th was only part of the sale on the 28th, but the delivery of the
dock warrants was certainly a conversion. It was the only delivery
which could be effected. [They cited Addison on Torts 193, and

Jones v. Cliff, 1 Cr. & M. 540.]
Powell, Q. C., in support of the rule.-Admitting that the defendant had entered into a binding contract with the purchaser to
sell the brandy on the 28th, there was no conversion until the purchaser obtained possession, which was not till the 80th. All that
the bought and sold notes would do would be to give the purchaser
a right of action against the defendant if he had not delivered the
brandy. The defendant, by taking this liability on himself, did
not prejudice the plaintiff. There was no evidence to show that the
dock warrants were delivered during banking hours, on the 29th,
and if the loan was not paid within banking hours, the defendant
had a right to sell. [He cited Cross on. Lien 385 ; llis and

Others v. Runt and Others, 3 T. R. 464; Zwinger v. &amuda, 7
Taunt. 265; Lucas and Others v. .Dorien and Others, Id. 278; and
Spear v. Traners and Another, 4 Camp. 251.]
Cur. adv. vult.
ERLE, C. J., delivered the judgment of the Court.-This-was an
action of trover by an assignee, -under the bankruptcy of one Cumrng. The facts were, that Cuming had deposited brandy, lying in a
dock, with Stear, by delivering to him the dock warrants, and had
agreed that Stear might sell if the loan was not repaid on the 29th
January; that on the 28th January Stear sold the brandy, and on
the 29th handed over the dock warrants to the vendee, who, ont the
80th, took actual possession. Upon these facts the questions are,
first, u .s there a conversion, and if yes, secondly, what is the mea.
sure of damages. To the first question our answer is in the affirmative. The wrongful sale on the 28th, followed on the 29th by the
delivery of the dock warrants then in pursuance thereof, was, we
think, a conversion; the defendant wrongfully assumed tobe owner in
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selling, and although the sale alone might not be a conversion, yet
by delivering over the dock warrants to the vendee, in pursuance of
such sale, he interfered with the right which Cuming had of taking
possession on the 29th if he repaid the loan, for which purpose the
dock warrants would have been important instruments. We decide
for the plaintiff on this ground, and it is not necessary to consider
the other grounds on which he relied to prove a conversion. Then
the second question arises. The plaintiff contends that he is entitled to the full value of the goods sold by the defendant, without
any deduction, on the ground that the interest of the defendant
as bailee ceased when he made a wrongful sale, and that, therefore,
he became liable to all the damages which a mere wrongdoer, who
had wilfully appropriated to himself the property of another withbut any right, ought to pay.

But we are of opinion that the plaintiff was not entitled to the
full value of the goods. The deposit of the goods in question with
the defendant to secure repayment of'a loan to him on a given day,
with a power to sell in case of default on that day, created an interest and a right of property in the goods which was more than
a mere lien, and the wrongful acts of the pawnee did not annihilate
the contract between the parties, nor the interest of the pawne?
in the goods under that contract. It is clear that the actual da.
mage was merely nominal; the defendant by mistake delivered
over the dock warrants a few hours only before the sale and delivery by him would have been lawful, and by such premature delivery the plaintiff did not lose anything, as he had no intention to
redeem the pledge by paying the loan. If the plaintiff's actiou
had been for breach of contract in not keeping the pledge till the
given day, he would have been entitled to be compensated for the
loss he had really sustained, and no more, and that would be a
nominal loss only. The plaintiff's action here is in name for the
wrongful conversion, but in substance it is the same cause of action,
and the change of the form of pleading ought not in reason to
affect the amouhit of compensation to be paid. There is authority
for holding, that in measuring the damage to be paid to the pawner
by the pawnee for a wrongful conversion, of the pledge, the inte.
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rest of the pawnee in the pledge ought to be taken into account.
On this principle the damages were measured in Chinery vs. Viall,
5 H. & Norm. 288. There the defendant had sold sheep to the
plaintiff; because there was delay in the payment of the price by
the plaintiff, the defendant resold the sheep. For this wrong the
Court held that trover lay, and that the plaintiff was entitled to
recover damages; but in measuring the amount of those damages,
although the plaintiff was entitled to be indemnified against any
loss he had really sustained by the resale, yet that the defendant, as an unpaid vendor, had an interest in the sheep against the
vendee under the contract of sale, and might deduct the price due
to himself from the plaintiff from the value of the sheep at the
time of the conversion. In Story on Bailments, art. 815, it is
said--- If the pawner, in coisequence of any default or conversion
by the pawnee, has, by an action, recovered the value of the pawn;
still the debt remains, and is reeoverable, unless in some prior-action
it 'has been deducted. It seems, that by the common law, the
pawnee, in such action brought for the tort, has a right to have the
amount of his debt recouped in damages." For this he cites Jarvis vs. .Rogeis, 15 Mass. Rep. 389. The principle is also exemplified in Brierly vs. Kendall, 17 Q. B. 937. There, although the
form of the security was mortgage, and not a pledge; and although
the action was trespass, and not trover ; yet the substance of the
transaction was -in close analogy with the present case. There
was a loan by the defendant to the plaintiff, secured by a bill of
sale of the plaintiff's goods, in which was a reservation to the plaintiff of right to the possession of the goods till he should make default in some payment. Before any default, the defendant took
the goods from the plaintiff, and sold them. For this wrong he was
liable in trespass, but the measure of damages was held to be, not
the value of the goods, but the loss which the plaintiff had really Bus.
tained by being deprived of the possession. The wrongful act of
the defendant did not annihilate his interest in the goods under
the bill of sale, and such interest was to be considered in measuring the extent of the plaintiff's right to damages. On these authorities we hold, that the damages due to the plaintiff for the
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wrongful conversion of the pledge by the defendant are to be measured by the loss he has really sustained, and that in measuring those
damages, the bailment of the defendant in the pledge at the time
of the conversion is to be taken into the account. It follows that the
amount is merely nominal; therefore, rule that the verdict for the
plaintiff shall stand, with damages 408.
WILLIAmS, J.-I

am of the same opinion as to the first point,
viz. whether there was a conversion by the defendant, but I do not
agree with the rest of the court in the view they take of the other
point, namely, the question as to the amount of damages. As to
the first point, I think the delivery of the dock warranta was a
conversion. It is, in fact, the means by which property which is
incapable of manual transfer can be got at, and therefore the delivery by the pledgee of the dock warrants to the vendee prevented the present plaintiff from getting it, and. enabled the purchaser
to get possession of it. As to the amount of damages, I think the
plaintiff is entitled to have the full value of the goods. I apprehend
the general rule to be this-in an action of trover the true measure of damages is the value of the property at the time of the
conversion. Xo doubt that rule is subject to several exceptions;
one of which is the ordinary rule, that where the defendant has
taken back the thing which is the subject of the action, the plaintiff can then only recover the damages he has sustained by reason
of the mere detention. Again: there is an exception in respect
of the amount of interest of the plaintiff, if the plaintiff has only a
limited interest, and some other person has a further interest posterior to the plaintiff. But the law, I apprehend, is clear, that though,
as against a stranger, the plaintiff who has to part with his interest
is entitled to recover the whole amount of damages, yet as against
a person who has a joint interest with him in the property, he is
entitled to recover only in respect to such interest as he himself
nas. Such was the decision in Brierly vs. Kendall. The property
was in the possession of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff, by the deed
,f assignment, had a specific, or a particular, estate in the property
assigned. Therefore, the only subject to be considered would be
the amount of damages; and that case is only an example as to
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the measure of damage between two parties, both having an interest
in the property. The plaintiff can only recover in respect of the
extent of his interest. Then comes the question as to the lien.
I certainly thought the law was settled, that if a person has a lien
upon property, and sells the property which is the subject of the
lien, he destroys the right of lien, and altogether annihilates the
lien. That, I apprehend, will be found to be the principle upon
which a great number of cases have been decided. I only refer
to one class, because that is the class which is referred to in Story
on Bailments, art. 325- He says, "The doctrine of the common
law, now- established in England, after some diversity of opinion,
is, that a factor, having a lien on goods for advances, or fora
general balance, has no right to pledge the goods; and if he does
pledge them, he conveys no- title to the pledgee. The effect of
this doctrine is, in England, to deny to the pledgee any right in
such a case to retain the goods for the advances or balances due.
to the- factor. In short, the transfer is deemed wholly tortious;
so that the principal may sue for and recover the pledge, without
making any allowance or deduction whatsoever for the debts due
by him to the factor." The same learned-writer then goes on to
state, that "the inconvenience, not to say the harshness, of the latter
part of the doctrine has been very seriously felt in England ;" and he
goes on to express his hope, that the American courts would not feel
themselves constrained by the pressure 9f authority to yield to it.
However, the editor of the last edition of Story on Bailments adds,.
that "later decisions have, however, fully settled the law, that a
pjledge by a factor of his principal's goods is wholly tortious, and
the owner may recover their full value from the pledger, without
any deduction or recoupment for his claim against the factor."
The recent case of Siebel vs. Springfield, 9 Law T., N. S., 825,
decided two or three days ago in the Court of Queen's Bench, establishes the principle as to the right of the owner of goods, subject to a lien to recover the whole value of them, in case the party
entitled to the lien converts them ; and the law, I apprehend, is
adopted in that case. But then, that being the law as to lien. I
apprehend there is no doubt the case of Chinerii vs. riall estab.
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lishes the rule, that in the case of a resale by an unpaid vendor.
an action of trover may be maintained by the original vendee, but
that he can only recover the value of the bargain, and not the entire
value of the goods. That, I apprehend, is put upon the ground of
the peculiar position of an unpaid vendor, upon the principle that he
has more than a lien; has an interest greater than the lien of the goods.
The interest which he has is not merely the result of the contract
by which the lien is created; he has an ulterior interest, and an
interest altogether beyond the lien. That is the ground on which
that case may be considered as not extending to the general principle, but applicable only to the peculiar position of an unpaid vendor. But with respect to a pawnee, it may be conceded, that he
may have something more than a mere lien; but whatever his estate may be, I apprehend, that as soon as the bailment has terminated, that estate would also terminate, because it is the mere creature of the bailment. There is no interest whatever in the pledgee
not derived from the bailment; therefore, as soon as the bailment
comes to an end, the estate, whatever it may be, of the pledgee
dependent on, and growing from, the bailment, must also be an.
nihilated. In Story on Bailments, that question is to a certain
extent considered ; and in sect. 327 the author says, " It has been
intimated that there is, or may be, a distinction favorable to the
pledgee which does not apply, or may not apply, to a factor, since
the latter has but a lien, whereas the former has a speoial property,
in the goods. It is not very easy to point out any substantial distinction between the case of a pledgee and the case of a factor.
The latter holds the goods of his principal as a security and pledge
for his advances, and the other feels he has a special property in
them, and may maintain an action for any violation of his possession, either by the principal or by A stranger." There is also
a case (Whitaker vs. Sumner, 20 Pick. Rep. 399), referred to in
Story on Bailments, in support of the proposition laid down in Story,
art. 299, that if the pledgee voluntarily, by his own act, places the
pledge beyond his own power to restore it, as by agreeing that it
may be attached at the suit of a third party, that will amount to
a waiver of his pledge. The case we have now under consideration

